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A Judicial Blow for "Jane Crowism" at The
Citadel in Faulkner v. Jones
SARA L. MANDELBAUM*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970's, feminist lawyers seeking to advance women's
rights have fought to eliminate de jure discrimination against women by
persuading the Supreme Court that gender-based classifications in the law
should be subject to the rigors of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the intermediate
scrutiny test adopted by the Court in 1976' has served to invalidate most
de jure discrimination,2 though certainly not the myriad forms of de facto
discrimination in the lives of American women.
One of the last remaining forms of outright de jure discrimination
against women has been flourishing in the South, where two public
institutions of higher learning are employing tactics of the massive resistance
era in order to keep their doors closed to women: The Citadel, The Military
College of South Carolina, and the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"). On
July 22, 1994, in a decision of historic significance for women, a federal
district court ordered the immediate admission of Shannon Faulkner to the
152-year-old Citadel Corps of Cadets.3
On April 13, 1995, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the district court, holding that defendants, the State of Carolina and

* Sara L. Mandelbaum is a staff attorney for the Women's Rights Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union, counsel to Shannon Richey Faulkner in the pending
litigation against The Citadel, and amicus in the Government's case against the Virginia
Military Institute ("VMI"). This article represents an abridged portion of a work in progress
that will address more fully the constitutional issues raised in the Shannon Faulkner case as
well as those raised in the case against VMI.
1. Following the Court's departure from traditional "rational basis" scrutiny for gender
classifications in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and the failure of a majority to adopt
strict scrutiny in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the landmark case Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) announced a new standard for gender classifications known
interchangeably as "intermediate," "middle-tier," or "heightened" scrutiny.
2. But see, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding all-male draft
registration).
3. Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994) [hereinafter Faulkner 1].
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The Citadel, were violating Shannon Faulkner's right to equal protection.4
On the question of the remedy of immediate admission, the court affirmed
with modification, allowing defendants the opportunity to present to the
district court a remedial plan for an alternative "parallel program" that
conforms to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. In the event,
however that defendants' plan is not approved by the district court or
implemented by August 12, 1995, the date on which the Citadel cadets are
to report for the fall semester, the court ordered the Citadel to admit
Faulkner on that date.5
Although the legal issues in the VMI litigation are similar to those in
the Citadel case, the posture of the VMI case is different because the
Commonwealth of Virginia, unlike the State of South Carolina, devised a
proposed remedy that, it argued, obviates the need to coeducate VMI. The
"remedy" was the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL"), a
residential program for women at a private women's school, Mary Baldwin
College ("the Mary Baldwin Plan"). On January 26, 1995, the Fourth
Circuit upheld this proposal, finding that it was separate but "substantively
comparable" to VMI, if not "separate but equal." 6 The VWIL program,
hosted by the financially ailing Mary Baldwin College, illustrates well the
principle that, in the context of public higher education, separate is, in
practice, as "inherently unequal"7 when the segregation is by race, as it is
when segregation is by gender.
Both the VMI and Citadel decisions are noteworthy for several reasons,
not the least of which is that they pave the way for the resolution of at least
two open questions of constitutional law affecting women's rights. First,
should gender-based classifications finally be elevated to the same
constitutional status as classifications based on race and national origin,
thereby requiring that such classifications be subject to strict rather than
"intermediate" scrutiny? If so, what would be the impact of applying strict
scrutiny to gender classifications in other areas of the law, particularly
pregnancy and abortion? And second, should the doctrine of "separate but
equal" (or the even lesser standard applied by the court in the VMI case,
"separate but substantively comparable"), so rightfully discredited in cases

4. Faulkner v. Jones, No. 94-1978, slip. op. (4th Cir., April 13, 1995) [hereinafter

Faulkner 11].
5. Id. at 4.

6. United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 94-1667, 1995 WL 29863, at *10
(4th Cir. January 26, 1995) [hereinafter VM I].
7. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
8. See, J.E.B. v. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994) (suggesting that a strict scrutiny
standard of review for gender classifications may be appropriate).
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of racial segregation, be given a new respectability when it comes to
compulsory gender segregation?
A full exploration and analysis of these complex issues are beyond the
scope of the present article which aims to highlight the salient legal
questions raised by the VMI and Faulkner litigations, in hopes of bringing
those questions to the attention of the legal community.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Shannon Richey Faulkner, a resident and taxpayer of South Carolina,
is a twenty year old woman. An honors student and varsity athlete at Wren
High School, in Easley, South Carolina, she was one of ten senior students
selected by the high school faculty to its 1992-93 Hall of Fame. While a
senior, Faulkner applied to several colleges, among them, her first choice,
The Citadel.
The Citadel is no ordinary school and its Corps of Cadets is no
ordinary student body.9 It is the only public institution of higher learning
in South Carolina that offers single-gender education in a "holistic" militarystyle system. While it provides a standard liberal arts curriculum, it operates
in a kind of faux-military environment, with uniformed cadets and faculty,
military "rankings" assigned to faculty and selected students, and a tightly
packed reveille-to-taps schedule. The school days include drills, inspections,
random punishments meted out by upperclassmen, and other rituals
designed, according to The Citadel, to instill in cadets a sense of discipline
and leadership. The Citadel generally succeeds in its goal of producing
leaders, as it has alumni in virtually every center of power in the State of
South Carolina.1 °
Established by the State of South Carolina in 1842, The Citadel has an
endowment of almost $20 million, and the Citadel Development Foundation
has assets of at least $65 million."
9. See generally Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel,THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 5, 1994.
10. Citadel alumni include a United States Senator for South Carolina, former
governors of South Carolina, a sitting associate justice on the South Carolina Supreme Court,
two sitting United States district court judges, the current president of the University of South
Carolina, a United States Ambassador, the current mayors of Charleston and Greenville,
South Carolina, as well as numerous state legislators and prominent business leaders. See
Trial Transcripts Vol. IX at 87:24-88:2, Vol. VI at 101:24-102:6, Vol. XII at 104:11-105:6,
Faulkner v. Jones (on file with the Northern Illinois University Law Review); Trial Exhibit
236, Faulkner v. Jones (on file with the Northern Illinois University Law Review).
11. The question is frequently asked: Why would an intelligent young woman want
to attend a school with a reputation for hazing and intolerance? The answer is probably
more complex than the scope of this article allows, but simply put, The Citadel's reputation
for excellence (particularly in the field of Education, in which Faulkner plans to major), and
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On January 22, 1993, The Citadel notified "Mr. Faulkner" that she had
been provisionally accepted into the Corps of Cadets, pending her graduation from high school and the completion of certain medical forms.
Apparently, The Citadel admissions office assumed that Faulkner was male,
due to her androgynous name and the absence of any reference to gender in
the application. 2 Upon discovering her gender, The Citadel promptly
expressly noting that the Corps of
revoked its acceptance of Faulkner,
13
Cadets was open to men only.
Faulkner filed a class action suit in the United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina on March 2, 1993, seeking a permanent
injunction compelling her admission to The Citadel's Corps of Cadets. 4

for excellence (particularly in the field of Education, in which Faulkner plans to major), and
its loyal alumni network, are unmatched in South Carolina. In addition, Faulkner's older
brother's service in the Navy made an enduring impression on her. She welcomes the
challenge of a rigorous military environment as well as the opportunities after graduation of
having attended a military-style school that is among the biggest and most prestigious
"fraternities" in the country.
12. The Citadel application neither inquires as to the gender of applicants, nor requires
a photograph of applicants. Faulkner requested that her high school guidance counselor
delete references to her gender from her transcript, which her high school forwarded
separately to The Citadel. Although the Citadel admissions office failed to take note of it,
the application did mention Faulkner's participation in high school softball which, in South
Carolina, is comprised only of young women.
13. The letter rescinding Faulkner's provisional admission to The Citadel stated in part:
Yesterday we received information from your High School that you are
not eligible for admission to the undergraduate day program at The Citadel. The
Citadel day program is a single-gender college program for males under the
provisions of Title IX of the Federal Education Act of 1972....
This letter also is to notify you that the provisional acceptance of your
application for admission . . . is hereby withdrawn, and your application for
admission is hereby rejected.
Letter from The Citadel to Shannon Faulkner (Feb. 10, 1993) (on file with the Northern
Illinois University Law Review).
14. When it became apparent that the merits of the case would not be resolved before
the commencement of the 1993-94 school year, Faulkner filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction on July 7, 1993, seeking admission to classes at The Citadel for her first semester
of college. The motion was granted and affirmed by the Fourth Circuit on November 17,
1993.
Upon the Fourth Circuit's denial of a rehearing en banc, The Citadel filed an
emergency application for a stay of the injunction with the United States Supreme Court on
January 12, 1994, the day before Faulkner was to begin classes. Chief Justice Rehnquist
denied The Citadel's application "in all respects." Virginia Military Institute v. United States,
113 S.Ct. 2431, 2431 (1993).
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III. THE RELATED CASE AGAINST THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE

Three years before Shannon Faulkner brought suit, the United States
had filed a similar suit, on March 1, 1990, challenging the males-only
admissions policy of the public Virginia Military Institute under the Equal
Protection Clause. 5 VMI defended its policy by arguing that under the
heightened scrutiny test, the exclusionary admissions policy was "substantially related" to the Commonwealth's "important objective" of providing its
6
citizens with "diversity" among educational institutions of higher learning.'

Following a trial on the merits which included testimony on the alleged

value of single-sex education 17 to both men and women, the District Court
for the Western District of Virginia concluded, as a factual matter only (and
therefore not controlling precedent in The Citadel case) that single-sex
education is beneficial to men and that VMI's males-only policy is "fully
justified" insofar as the admission of women would "significantly" change
the so-called "adversative" method of instruction and harsh living conditions
that characterize barracks life at VMI. The court found that Virginia's goal

15. See United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1411-13 (W.D.
Va. 1991).
16.
It is interesting to note that educators normally use the term "diversity" to denote
increased nondiscriminatory access for all sectors of the populace, rather than as an excuse
for limiting access based on invidious criteria. Similarly, in the context of constitutional law,
the concept of diversity normally connotes inclusivity rather than exclusivity. See, e.g., Metro
Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding minority preference in granting
broadcast licenses in order to achieve broadcast diversity); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (recognizing ethnic diversity as one element that a university might
consider toward the goal of creating a heterogenous student body).
17. Although the question whether single-sex education has any pedagogical value is
of questionable relevance for purposes of deciding the constitutional issue raised by the
exclusion of women from a unique educational experience, it nevertheless became an issue
in the trial court. VMI's argument that single-sex education is of universal pedagogical value
was, in the best light, hyperbolic and misleading. In retrospect, it is clear that the
government should have mounted a vigorous challenge to this argument, instead of allowing
the assumptions to go virtually unchallenged.
Educators disagree on this issue, and their opinions vary depending upon a number
of factors, including the stage of education (secondary or post-secondary), and the specific
purpose, if any, of the single-sex environment. There is much more information available
about female single-sex educational environments than male ones, since there are relatively
few of the latter. From the data that is available, however, a noteworthy finding emerges:
Whereas evidence suggests that all-female educational environments may, in some instances,
be beneficial to women, the converse is not true for men. Indeed, there is evidence that allmale educational environments are detrimental to men, in that they foster sexism, and other
hostile attitudes toward those perceived as different. See generally Valerie Lee, Single-Sex
Schooling: What is the Issue?, in SINGLE SEX SCHOOLING: PROPONENTS SPEAK Vol. 11at

43 (U.S. Dep't Educ. 1994).
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of "diversity in education" was a legitimate state interest that was furthered
by the exclusion of women."
The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and held that the
males-only policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because "Virginia
has failed to articulate an important objective which supports the provision
of this unique educational opportunity to men only."' 9 The Court stated:
If VMI's male-only admissions policy is in furtherance of
a state policy of "diversity," the explanation of how the
policy is furthered by offering a unique educational
benefit to only males is lacking. A policy of diversity
which aims to provide an array of educational opportunities, including single-gender institutions, must do more
than favor one gender.2 °
Despite this unequivocal ruling on VMI's liability under the Constitution, both VMI and the Justice Department claimed victory. 2' VMI
claimed victory because the Fourth Circuit stopped short of mandating the
admission of women. The court volunteered that the Commonwealth could
avoid having to admit women if it could devise a remedial plan in
conformity with equal protection. 22 The court offered that the Commonwealth might decide to admit women, establish parallel institutions or
programs, abandon state support of VMI, or propose other more creative
23
options or combinations.
In suggesting alternatives for the Commonwealth to explore, the Fourth
Circuit did not rule that any one of these options would in fact satisfy the
requirements of equal protection. Indeed, the issue of alternative remedies
had been neither briefed nor argued at this stage of the litigation. By the
18. 766 F. Supp. at 1411-13.
19. United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter VMI 1]. Of course under well-settled constitutional law, the mere articulation of
such an objective would not have ended the inquiry. See Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 278 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring)
("The mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not. an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.") (quoting
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)).
20. VMI I at 899.
21. It was VMI, however, and not the Justice Department, that appealed to the
Supreme Court, seeking a stay of the judgment.
22. In the Faulkner case, plaintiff has taken the position that no remedy other than
admission to The Citadel Corps of Cadets would satisfy equal protection. Amici in VM!I
have also taken this position. See generally McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
23. VMI I at 900.
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same token, it is doubtful that the court would have sent the parties off to
engage in a meaningless exercise. Implicit in the court's ruling was its
apparent belief--advanced by The Citadel but vigorously opposed by
Faulkner in that litigation--that the Constitution does not compel admission
of women to these schools as a matter of law.
On remand, the VMI I trial court approved the Commonwealth's
proposed remedial plan--VWIL, or the Mary Baldwin Plan. Significantly,
the court adopted a diluted version of the "separate but equal" standard,
holding that the Mary Baldwin Plan passed constitutional muster because it
met the court's newly crafted "separate but substantively comparable"
test.2
The Mary Baldwin Plan is, as Judge Dickson Phillips recognized in
dissent, only "a pale shadow of VMI" that cannot possibly replicate the
prestige of VMI, its vast and powerful alumni network, or its rich endowment. 25 VMI is the most heavily endowed college in the nation, public or
private, according to a financial analyst in higher education and witness for
the government, who estimated VMI's endowment at $131 million. 6 By
contrast, the ailing Mary Baldwin College was suffering an estimated $6.5
million deficit before accepting VMI's offer of $6.9 million in private funds
from the VMI Foundation 7 to host the VWIL program.2 8 While Mary
Baldwin College administrators tried to portray the deal with VMI as a
"wonderful opportunity" for Virginia women, Mary Baldwin students
minced no words, describing the deal as sexist, "supporting this old-boy
network that is ultimately bad for women, "and just a way of "us[ing] Mary
Baldwin to get VMI off the hook."29 Another student noted that the
suggestion that Mary Baldwin did not already strive to produce women who
are leaders was insulting to currently enrolled students. One student noted:

24. VMI I at 904.
25. United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 94-1667, slip op. at 39 (4th Cir.
January 26, 1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
26. VMI Plan gets Grim Prognosis,ROANOKE TIMES AND WORLD NEWS, February 12,
1994, at C1.
27. The fact that the funds were provided by private citizens, VMI alumni and
supporters who contribute to the VMI Foundation rather than by the taxpayers of the
commonwealth, who finance VMI, raises serious constitutional questions as to whether a
privately financed remedial program can satisfy the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of
whether or not that program is comparable or equal. The government did not advance this
argument in its challenge to the Mary Baldwin Plan.
28. Id.
29. Planfor Female VMI Splits Campus, WASH. POST September 29, 1993, at D1.
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"I came here not because I thought Mary Baldwin was a finishing school,
but because I thought Mary Baldwin was a leadership institution."3
Indeed, the Mary Baldwin Plan is also a profound insult to the women
for whom it is supposedly a "remedy" to VMI's discriminatory exclusion.
In addition to the factors of power, prestige and wealth listed above, the
Mary Baldwin program lacks many of the distinguishing features of VMI,
including: (1) the unique holistic system of education in an adversative
military environment; (2) the requirement that cadets wear military uniforms
or adhere to military procedures, etiquette and lifestyle; (3) additional
military training or drilling beyond that already available to students at Mary
Baldwin College; (4) an opportunity to experience the barracks life, an
essential component of the VMI system; and (5) the opportunity to take any
courses in engineering on campus, much less the opportunity to earn a
Bachelor of Science degree in engineering. 3
In essence, the court held that, in contradistinction to cases involving
African-Americans, where gender segregation is concerned, the "parallel"
program need not even meet the test of "separate but equal" in order to pass
constitutional muster. Although the court thought that the differences
between VWIL and VMI were not based on stereotyping, the record in VMI
I is shamelessly replete with testimony by non-experts, purporting to be
giving an expert opinion on the alleged "differences" between the sexes that
justify segregated public education. Indeed, the district court itself reveals
the extent to which its decision arises out of archaic, harmful and grossly
stereotypic notions about proper gender roles in dredging up the following
simplistic metaphor: "If VMI marches to the beat of a drum, then Mary
Baldwin marches to the melody of a fife and when the march is over, both
will have arrived at the same destination."32

30. Id.
31. See United States' Opposition and Response to the VMI Defendant's Proposed
Remedial Plan at 2, United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia (on file with the Northern
Illinois University Law Review).
32. The court's metaphor belies its reliance on the rankest gender stereotypes-stereotypes which have, time and time again, long since been discredited by our courts. See,
e.g., J.E.B. v. T.B., 62 U.S.L.W. at 4223 (noting that the generalizations advanced "in
support of [the state's] asserted right to discriminate on the basis of gender is, at the least,
overbroad, and serves only to perpetuate the same 'outmoded notions of the relative
capabilities of men and women . . . that [the Court] has invalidated in other contexts.")
(quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)). See also
Mississippi University of Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729 (state's asserted purpose based
on outmoded stereotypes); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding similarly
to Hogan). Cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235, 272 (1989) (employment
decision based upon impermissible stereotypes of women and notions of proper "feminine"
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behavior violates Title VII).
The arbitrary association of males with the drum and females with the fife is no less
pernicious than the generalizations about women that have been used to keep us in "our
place" as exemplified in such infamous cases as Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
(describing the reasons for statutorily limiting women's, but not men's, work hours to no
more than ten hours per day):
The reasons for the reduction of the working day to ten hours--(a) the physical
organization of women, (b) her maternal functions, (c) the rearing and education
of the children, (d) the maintenance of the home--are all so important and so far
reaching that the need for such reduction need hardly be discussed.
Id. at 419; See also Hoyt v. Florida, 199 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1959) (upholding a state statute
against compulsory jury service for women):
Whatever changes may have taken place in the political or economic status of
women in our society, nothing has yet altered the fact of their primary responsibility, as a class, for the daily welfare of the family unit upon which our civilization
depends. The statute, in effect, simply recognizes that the traditional exclusion [of
women on Florida juries] was based not upon inherent disability or incapacity but
upon the premise that such demands might place an unwarranted strain upon the
social and domestic structure, or result in unwilling participation by those whose
conflicting duties, while not amounting to actual hardship, might yet be expected,
as a general rule, to affect the quality of their service as jurors.
Id. at 694; Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (statute forbidding all women from
tending bar constitutional in that bartending by women could have caused "moral and social
problems" despite the possibility of changed public attitudes about women in such positions);
In re Goodsell, 39 Wis. 232 (1876) (denying Ms. Goodsell's first application to practice law
in Wisconsin for the following reasons):
The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and
nurture of the children of our race and for the custody of the homes of the world
and their maintenance in love and honor. And all life-long callings of women,
inconsistent with these radical and sacred duties of their sex, as is the profession
of law, are departures from the order of nature; and when voluntary, treason against
it. ...
There are many employments in life not unfit for the female character.
The profession of law is surely not one of these. The peculiar qualities of womanhood, its gentle graces, its quick sensibility, its tender susceptibility, its purity, its
delicacy, its emotional impulses, its subordination of hard reason to sympathetic
feeling are surely not qualifications for forensic strife. Nature has tempered woman
as little for the juridical conflicts of the court room, as for the physical conflicts
of the battle field. Womanhood is molded for gentler and better things ... [and not
for the law, which is] all that is selfish and malicious, knavish and criminal, coarse
and brutal, repulsive and obscene.
Id. at 238 (Ms. Goodsell's application was granted three years later in In re Goodsell, 48
Wisc. 693 (1879); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130, 141 (1872) (denying Ms.
Bradwell's"application to practice law in Illinois):
The natural and-proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life ....
The paramount
destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife
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The fact that no one, including the trial court, seriously contends that
the Mary Baldwin program is equal to that of VMI, should, if Brown v.
Board of Education33 is to be our guide, result in a holding that the
alternative plan is plainly unconstitutional. But, on January 26, 1995, a
three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Mary
Baldwin Plan under the lower court's "substantively comparable" test, while
conceding that it "differs substantially" 34 from the program offered at VMI.
In doing so, the court affirmed the lowering of the applicable standard to
unprecedented depths, inventing out of whole cloth a "special" intermediate
scrutiny test. 35 Under its "new" test, the court stated, it must only "be
satisfied that both excluded men and excluded women have reasonable
opportunities to obtain benefits substantively comparable to those they are
denied. 3 6 Note that the court hypothesized a fictional class of "excluded
men" in order to justify its "special" test, despite the fact that this case arose
because of the exclusion of women from VMI. Men as well as women who
would choose to attend VMI are only too happy to be "excluded" from the
third-rate Mary Baldwin plan, whose sole purpose is to make possible the
perpetuation of an all-male VMI. To the extent that the panel's decision is
rooted in its unquestioning belief in stereotypes regarding perceived
intellectual and/or affective differences between men and women (or to its
deference to the "professional judgment" of certain educators whose ideas
are equally rooted in such stereotypes), 7 it is vulnerable to reversal by the
Supreme Court.
In the light of the Fourth Circuit's ruling in VMI I, Faulkner filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that The Citadel's similar males-only
admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause and that the sole
and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Id. at 141.
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting the "separate but equal" doctrine concerning the
public education of racial minorities).
34. VMI 11, No. 94-1667, 1995 WL 29863, at *4 (4th Cir. January 26, 1995).
35. Id. at *7.
36. Id. at *10.
37. At bottom, the panel's decision represents an abdication of its constitutional
function to subject the gender classification at issue--the exclusion of women from VMI -to the intermediate scrutiny required by decades of jurisprudence. The panel accomplished
this evasion by deferring submissively to some vague notion of "professional judgment:"
The mechanism for achieving the goals differ--VMI utilizing an adversative and
pervasive military regimen and VWIL proposing to utilize a structured environment

reinforced by some military training and a concentration on leadership development--but the difference is attributable to a professionaljudgment of how best to
provide the same opportunity.

ld. at *10 (emphasis added).
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governmental objective proffered by the State of South Carolina--"diversity
in education"--had been rejected by the Fourth Circuit as a justification for
offering the benefit to men alone.38 The Citadel admitted in depositions
that it could not afford to go private, which would require the school to
39
compensate the state in an amount estimated to be at least $350 million.
Nor was there any indication that the State of South Carolina had either the
ability or willingness to propose a parallel program or other "creative
option" in conformity with the Fourteenth Amendment.4 ' There was no
possibility of a compact arrangement with a women's school in South
Carolina. Neither Columbia nor Converse College, the only two women's
schools in the state, appeared at that time to have any interest in such an
arrangement.4 Indeed, Dr. Mary J. Frame, dean of the Leadership Institute
at Columbia College, has publicly rejected the Notion that her school could
provide leadership training similar to The Citadel's, stating that "[t]o imply
that students could attend classes at either of these colleges and be provided
similar types of leadership education is in direct opposition to each
institution's beliefs about how twenty first century leaders should be

educated. ,42

Rather than decide the case on summary judgment, the court decided
to hold a trial, which began on May 16, 1994. Given the Fourth Circuit's
decision allowing VMI to propose a remedy other than coeducation, the
Faulkner court gave The Citadel sixty days to propose a remedial plan for
Shannon Faulkner and other women similarly situated. The Citadel
submitted papers claiming that it needed more time to devise an alternative
remedy; 43 those papers did not contain a plan for the immediate redress of
Faulkner's constitutional rights.
Taking its cue from the appellate court's ruling in VMI, the Faulkner
court limited the triable issues to the following: (1) How, if at all, does
South Carolina's justification of "diversity" differ from Virginia's justifica-

38. On May 6, 1993, the United States moved to intervene on behalf of Faulkner and
to add the State of South Carolina as a defendant. The court granted the motion on June 7,
1993.
39. Deposition of Claudius E. Watts, I, President of The Citadel at 205-206 (on file
with the Northern Illinois University Law Review).

40. Trial Transcript, Vol. VII, Faulkner v. Jones (testimony of officials from Columbia

and Converse) (on file with the Northern Illinois University Law Review).
41. Id.
42. Columbia College, The Citadel Teach Different Styles of Leadership, THE STATE
PAPER,

February 8, 1995, at 31.

43. Defendants' Motion To Bifurcate Or, In The Alternative, For A Continuance,
Faulkner v. Jones (filed March 1, 1994).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

tion, which the Fourth Circuit rejected in VMI?; and (2) Has The Citadel
established that it can provide an alternative remedy to coeducation?"
III. THE LEGAL SETTING: THE APPLICABLE EQUAL PROTECTION
JURISPRUDENCE

Both The Citadel's and VMI's exclusionary policies were properly held
unconstitutional under the current intermediate standard of review for gender
classifications. Yet, if strict scrutiny had been required instead, there would
have been no question that the lessons of race segregation exemplified by
Plessy v. Ferguson 45 (in which the Supreme Court first endorsed the
46
concept of "separate but equal") and Brown v. Board of Education (in
which the Court rejected that concept) would have been applicable to the
Citadel and VMI cases. As Shannon Faulkner knows, being rejected from
a public college for which one is qualified, based solely on the immutable
characteristic of one's sex, is humiliating and stigmatizing--a demeaning
judgment of inferiority, all the more harmful because it has the imprimatur
of the state.
Until 1976, the Supreme Court employed one of two kinds of equal
protection analysis. Most legislation received the "rational basis" treatment:
such legislation survives constitutional review as long as it is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective. Virtually all legislation
Rights deemed fundamental or group
passes this low-threshold test.4
classifications deemed "suspect" undergo a more rigorous analysis requiring
a compelling state purpose and a necessary relationship between that
purpose and the classification.
In the landmark case of Craig v. Boren," the Court formulated an
"intermediate" tier of review, which it has since applied primarily to gender44. While Faulkner's counsel had prepared to address the broader range of issues that

had been raised by the record, we agreed to this limitation of the triable issues only because
it was understood by the court and expressly stated on the record that such a limitation did
not constitute an adoption of or agreement with any of the findings of fact made by the trial
court. This included findings regarding the supposed "real differences" between the sexes;
the alleged pedagogical value of single-sex education for men; and the 'conclusion that the
admission of women would materially alter the very program in which women seek to
partake--all of which Shannon Faulkner's legal team was and remains eager and ready to
controvert in the Faulkner litigation.
45. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46. 347 U.S. 438 (1954).
47. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding Michigan law
prohibiting women from-employment as bartenders because it had the reasonable purpose of
preventing "moral and social problems").
48. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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based classifications. "Intermediate" or "heightened" scrutiny requires
something between a legitimate and compelling state purpose--an "inportant" purpose--and something between a rational and a necessary relationship--a "substantial relationship." This test has been used to invalidate sexbased differentials in virtually all areas of public life including education, 49

employment,

°

property disposition," jury service,52 alimony,53 drinking

age,' age of majority, 5' and social welfare benefits.56
The Court has recently suggested that it may be ready to consider
whether strict scrutiny should apply to gender classifications. In J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel T.B.,57 the Court acknowledged the commonalities between
race and sex discrimination in American society, and stated that: "[w]e need
not determine, however, whether women or racial minorities have suffered
more at the hands of discriminatory state actors during the decades of our
Nation's history."5 M Recognizing our country's "long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination,"59 the Court explicitly reserved for another
day the question of whether gender discrimination, like race, deserves a
more rigorous level of scrutiny. 60 Similarly, in her concurring opinion in
Harrisv. Forklift Systems, 61 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that, while
Title VII treats sex and race discrimination as equally unlawful, "it remains
an open question [under the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence]
whether classifications based on gender are inherently suspect.',, 6 2

49. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-27 (1982).
50. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-52 (1980); Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1975).
51. See Kirschberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 458-59 (1981); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 75-77 (1971).
52. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994).
53. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1979).
54. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
55. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1975).
56. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973).
57. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
58. Id. at 1425; compare the Court's statement in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978): "[tjhe perception of racial classifications as inherently odious
stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender classifications do not share."
59. 114 S.Ct. at 1425 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
60. Id. at 1426 n.6.

61. 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993).

62. Id. at 373 n.* (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). As counsel to Shannon Faulkner,
the Women's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union argued, and will continue
to argue, that gender-based classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny, even though
The Citadel's discriminatory admissions policy fails even the intermediate scrutiny test.
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63
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan the Supreme Court
held that a single-sex admissions policy could not be justified under a state
policy of educational diversity which conferred a benefit upon only one
gender. The Court reaffirmed that a party seeking to classify individuals on
the basis of gender must demonstrate "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification.' There, a male plaintiff sought admission to
the all-female nursing program offered by Mississippi University for Women
("MUW"), a public university. The Supreme Court, applying the intermediate scrutiny test, held that the exclusion of men from MUW's nursing
program was not substantially related to its proposed objective of compensating women for past discrimination and held that the policy violated the
6
The Court
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '
could be
policy
exclusionary
MUW's
that
argument
the
rejected
expressly
education:
in
diversity
of
objective
justified by a state

Justice Powell's dissent suggests that a second objective
is served by the gender-based classification in that
Mississippi has elected to provide women a choice of
Since any gender-based
educational environments ....
classification provides one class a benefit or choice not
available to the other class, however, that argument begs
the question. The issue is not whether the benefitted class
profits from the classification, but whether the State's
decision to confer a benefit only upon one class by means
of a discriminatory classification is substantially related to
achieving a legitimate and substantial goal."
In Sweatt v. Painter7--decided in 1950, before Brown v. Board of
Education--the Supreme Court ordered the admission of a black student to
the University of Texas Law School, a well established whites-only school.
While Texas offered a separate blacks-only law school, the Supreme Court
held that the all-black school could not provide students with access to the
unique prestige and professional opportunities afforded to white students at
the University of Texas." The Court well understood that the exclusion of

63. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
64. Id. at 724; see also Kirschberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).

65. 458 U.S. at 733.
66. Id. at 731 n.17.

67. 339. U.S. 629 (1950).
68. See generally id.; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 323 U.S. 631 (1948) (compelling
state's only law school to admit black student); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938) (rejecting state's proposal to pay black students to attend out-of-state schools in
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blacks from the all-white school was neither the moral nor constitutional
equivalent of the "exclusion" of whites from the all-black school under
Plessy. The Court reached these conclusions by comparing both the tangible
factors, including the "number of faculty, variety of courses and opportunity
for specialization, size of the student body, [and] scope of the library ......
and the intangible factors, including "those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a ... school...
reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and
influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
69
prestige. ,
IV. THE FAULKNER DECISIONS IN THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF

APPEALS

On July 22, 1994, the court issued its decision holding that The
Citadel's males-only policy is unconstitutional and ordered the immediate
admission of Faulkner into the Corps of Cadets.7" The defendants sought
a stay of the mandate from the Fourth Circuit which was granted on August
12, 1994.71 Applying heightened scrutiny analysis, the district court held
that The Citadel failed to show that its discriminatory admissions policy
serves any important governmental objective at all, much less one that is
substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental
objective.7"
Specifically, the court stated that The Citadel failed even to "articulate
an important policy that substantially supports offering the unique benefits
of a Citadel-type education to men and not to women, and The Citadel's
refusal to admit Faulkner to its Corps of Cadets because of her sex violates"
her right to equal protection.73

order to avoid obligation to integrate under the Equal Protection Clause).
69. 339 U.S. at 633-34.
70. Faulkner 1, 858 F. Supp. 552, 568-69 (D.S.C. 1994). In addition to the 60 days
The Citadel was granted to devise an alternative remedy before the trial, the district court
allowed The Citadel yet another 60 days to submit a proposed remedial plan for any and all
other women who may wish to attend The Citadel. On October 5, 1994, The Citadel issued
a press release boasting that it would pledge $5 million to create a "Women's Leadership
Institute" ("WLI"). Under the WLI plan, The Citadel would simply subsidize the college
tuition of young women who attend one of the state's two private all-female schools and
allow them time to obtain military training at the Palmetto Military Institute in South
Carolina. As of this writing, no hearing on the adequacy of this "plan" has been scheduled.
71. Id.

72. Id. at 566.
73. Id.
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Although the Fourth Circuit had rejected "diversity" as a permissible
educational objective for excluding one gender from a state-supported
school, The Citadel tried nevertheless to assert a goal of "diversity"--but this
time with a twist. The defendants alleged that the State of South Carolina
excludes women from The Citadel because of a "gender-neutral" policy of
providing single-sex education based on "reasonable demand." The
defendants further alleged that there is insufficient demand for single-sex
opportunities for women.74
Based upon this novel argument, which as the trial judge noted in
75
reprimanding The Citadel, was not supported by one single case, the
Citadel went on to postulate that the rational basis test should apply since
76
the asserted justification for the discrimination was "gender-neutral."
77 that the
The court expressly rejected the defendant's argument
exclusion of women from The Citadel was justified by a state policy
favoring single-sex education as part of a diverse educational system, where
sufficient demand existed. The court held that the United States Supreme
Court "continues to clearly proclaim that those rights created by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are personal, individual
rights. 7 Even assuming demand would be a relevant criterion, the court
stated that "[d]emand is not the sole criterion for implementing new
programs in South Carolina. 7' 9 The court found that The Citadel would
0
attract between twenty and fifty women annually to its Corps of Cadets.
The Citadel further maintained that the court should have applied the
rational basis test instead of utilizing a heightened scrutiny standard of
74. Specifically, the defendants argued that "the absence of a public single-gender
program for women at the present time is based on the gender-neutral policy of responding
to student needs and demand to the extent permitted by finite educational resources."
Defendants' Post-Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9-10 (on file with the
Northern Illinois University Law Review).

Of course, this argument is completely irrelevant to Faulkner's goal of attending
The Citadel. She does not seek, nor has she ever sought, to attend an all-female school.
Moreover, this argument is glaringly inconsistent with The Citadel's proposed remedial plan
for other women who may wish to attend The Citadel, which purports to establish a

Women's Institute for Leadership (on file with the Northern Illinois Law Review). Should
The Citadel be put to its own test of establishing that a sufficient demand exists on the part
of women in South Carolina for a school whose very purpose is to ensure the continued
exclusion of women from the prestigious Citadel?
75. Faulkner 1, 858 F. Supp. at 564.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 565.
78. Id. (citing University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978)).
79. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 559.
80. Id. at 560.
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review. 1 This bizarre theory would require courts to ignore more than two
decades of equal protection jurisprudence. Under this standard of review,
any defendant could simply assert a "neutral" policy justification as a way
of avoiding liability. A review of the case law reveals the absurdity of this
proposition. In nearly every case of discrimination, the defendants routinely
assert a legitimate or important gender-neutral policy that is served by the
classification. These interests are indeed often legitimate, ranging from
concern for administrative efficiency,8 2 to traffic safety, 3 to the right to
a fair trial." The defendant's assertion of such an interest only begins the
court's constitutional inquiry, however.85
The court rejected this rational basis argument out of hand. 6 Despite
The Citadel's expensive campaign to urge the judge to ignore decades of
established constitutional law, the court well understood that the subject of
the equal protection inquiry is the discriminatory policy at issue--here, the
facially discriminatory college's admissions policy--and not, as The Citadel
would have had it, the articulated state interest of the defendants.
On the question of the appropriate remedy, the court found that the
only available remedy to redress Faulkner's rights was to order her
immediate admission into the Corps of Cadets program.8 7 The court found
that the remedial "plan" offered by the defendants "does not select any one
remedy or even prioritize those suggested." 88 The impracticability in South
Carolina of any alternative remedy to coeducation was confirmed by the
evidence at trial. Neither Converse College nor Columbia College (both
private, single-sex schools for women and the only two single-sex schools
for women in the state), had any interest in hosting or transforming itself
into a holistic, military-style program. 89 Nor could The Citadel afford to
go private, which would require that the school compensate the state in an
amount estimated to be at least $350 million.' °
81. Faulkner , 858 F. Supp. at 566 (discussing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979)).
82. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

83. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
84. J.E.B. v. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
85. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). ("The mere recitation of a benign,
compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.").
86. Faulkner 1, 858 F. Supp. at 566.
87. Id. at 568.
88. Id. at 561.
89. Trial Transcript Vol. VII at 64:1-15, 78:14-21, 96:22-97:1, Faulkner v. Jones (on
file with the Northern Illinois University Law Review).

90. Id. Vol. XIII at 43:8-45:3 (on file with the Northern Illinois University Law
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Citing Meredith v. Fair,91 the court held that the requirement that
discrimination be eliminated with "all deliberate speed" does not apply in
the case of higher education: "Time is not on the side of Faulkner. She is
now a rising sophomore and cannot become a member of the Corps of
92
Cadets after the beginning of her junior year." In ordering the immediate
admission of Faulkner to the Corps, the court was heavily influenced by The
Citadel's intransigence in failing to take any meaningful steps to propose an
alternative "parallel" program or "more creative options or combinations"
under the VMI decision.93 The court excoriated the defendants for their
seeming indifference:
At trial it became clear that nothing of substance had been
done by the defendants towards fashioning a remedy...
. Not once has a defendant done anything to indicate that
it is sincerely concerned to any extent whatsoever about
Faulkner's constitutional rights. The most revealing fact
of all, however, is that the defendants have continued to
defend this case at a cost of millions of dollars to the
taxpayers of South Carolina when they do not have a
single case to offer in support of their position that a lack
of demand for single-sex education on the part of women
94
justifies its providing such an education only for men.
Additionally, in an aside, the court noted in a footnote that it believed the
Mary Baldwin Plan to be unconstitutional as well."
The court also rejected defendants' argument of insufficient demand on
the part of women for a Citadel education. As the district court recognized,
the right to equal protection of the laws inures to the benefit of the
individual; it is not conditioned upon the number of other individuals who
96
seek redress for a particular violation. Moreover, common sense dictates

Review).

91. 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962) (stating "time is of the
essence" in college cases); see also Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 532 n.4
(1963) (stating that unlike elementary schools, "[r]ecognition of the possible need for delay
has not ... been extended to desegregation of state colleges or universities .... "); Florida
ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956) (per curiam) (ordering prompt
admission to graduate school).
92. Faulkner 1, 858 F. Supp. at 567.
93. Id.
94. Id.

95. Id. at 565 n.15.

96. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938); see also Carter v.

School Bd. of Arlington County, 182 F.2d 531, 535 (4th Cir. 1950); Mitchell v. United
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that demand follows opportunity and not vice-versa. Given The Citadel's
152-year tradition of excluding women, the "demand" for a Citadel
education among young women has hardly had time to manifest itself.
Historically, women were excluded from the United States service academies, as well as many posts in the armed forces.97 The defendants'
discriminatory practices against women only make it more difficult to show
the actual demand on the part of women for a military-style education. It
is well known that The Citadel's policy is to reject applications from young
women.9" Even so, there has been a considerable show of interest by young
women in the form of letters of inquiry." Based upon the facts adduced
at trial, the court found that "[t]he Citadel would attract between twenty and
fifty women annually to its Corps of Cadets if it were to become coeducational." 100
The district court thus refused to allow the State of South Carolina to
justify its discriminatory policy by asserting a state interest in responding to
what it perceives to be the market forces in public education." °1 In so
doing, the court recognized that the very notion of "demand" as a criterion
for determining constitutional rights, invites reliance on stereotypes. 2
Both the Mary Baldwin program in VMI and The Citadel's WLI program,
proposed sixty days after the trial, were explicitly designed in order to have
States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 (1941) (indicating that low demand by blacks for first-class railroad
transportation did not justify failure to provide equal facilities); McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914) (holding similarly to Mitchell). Similarly, in
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), the Court held that the
exclusion of one man from the nursing school violated the Fourteenth Amendment even
though he could have attended another nursing school sixty miles away from MUW; cf
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454-56 (1982) (holding that in Title VII context, the law
protects individuals not groups). This principle was recognized by the Supreme Court as
recently as in the J.E.B. majority opinion in which Justice Blackmun declared:
We need not determine, however, whether women or racial minorities have
suffered more at the hands of discriminatory state actors, . . . [but] only to
acknowledge that 'our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination,' a history. which warrants the heightened scrutiny we afford all
gender-based classifications today. Under our equal protection jurisprudence,
gender-based classifications require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in
order to survive constitutional scrutiny.
J.E.B. v. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994) (emphasis added).
97. See generally Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (recognizing historical
discrimination of women in the military).
98. Faulkner 1, 858 F. Supp. at 554.
99. Id. at 560
100. Id.
101. Id. at 566.
102. Id. at 564.
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wide appeal to college-bound women, and were explicitly conceived based
upon generalizations about the supposed educational "needs" of these young
women. 103
On April 13, 1995, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
"South Carolina and The Citadel are denying Faulkner equal protection of
the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.""' The court continued: "As for remedy, we affirm with modification, remanding the case to
the district court (1) to establish a new, practicable but prompt timetable in
requiring defendants to formulate, adopt, and implement a remedial plan that
conforms with the Equal Protection Clause, and (2) to require The Citadel
to admit Faulkner to the Corps of Cadets by [August 15, 1995], if such plan
05 Based
is not approved by the court and implemented before that date."
upon all the information available at the time this article went to print, it
seems highly doubtful that The Citadel will be able to formulate, much less
implement, a viable plan by August 15. In any event, such a plan could not
conform with the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of constitutional law
for the reasons discussed above.
Justice Kenneth K. Hall filed a concurring opinion explaining that he
is convinced that the court has "embarked on a path that will inevitably fall
short of providing women their deserved equal access to important avenues
of power and responsibility."'" Justice Hall recognized that the court first
went awry when it decided in VMI I to allow VMI to pursue a remedial
option other than coeducation, stating that "[t]hough we correctly concluded
that maintaining the status quo offended the Constitution, we failed to
7 Finally, Justice Hall
mandate VMI's integration--and thus we failed."'
had the courage to bring to light the real issue at stake in these cases,
declaring his suspicion that
these cases have very little to do with education. They
instead have very much to do with wealth. power, and the
ability of those who have it now to determine who will
have it later. The daughters of Virginia and South
Carolina have every right to insist that their tax dollars no
longer be spent to support what amount to fraternal
organizations whose initiates emerge as full-fledged
103.
proposed
104.
Faulkner
105.
106.
107.

See the VMI defendants' proposed remedial plan and The Citadel defendants'
remedial plan (on file with the Northern Illinois University Law Review).
Faulkner v. Jones, No. 94-1978, slip. op. at 4 (4th Cir. April 13, 1995) thereinafter
11].
Id.
concurring).
Id. at 28 (Hall, J.,
Id. (Hall, J., concurring).
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members of an all-male aristocracy. Though our nation
has, throughout its history, discounted the contributions
and wasted the abilities of the female half of the population, it cannot continue to do so. As we prepare, together,
to face the twenty-first century, we simply cannot afford
to preserve a relic of the nineteenth.'08
V. CONCLUSION

The parallels are striking between the judicial rationales used to uphold
laws of racial segregation and those now being used to justify the "separate
but substantively comparable" rules for women. For example, consider how
the Fourth Circuit in VMI IHhypothesized an imaginary class of men who
would be "excluded" from the Mary Baldwin Plan, in order to create an
illusion of symmetrical (and, presumably therefore, benign) gender
discrimination. In VMI IHthe court spoke of determining whether the
"mutual exclusion of women and men from each other's institutions"
allows
for those excluded to obtain benefits that are substantively comparable to the
other gender."'19 The problem with this formulation is that there is no
such "mutual exclusion" in VMI. Women are excluded from the all-male,
prestigious and taxpayer-financed VMI; but the all-female, decidedly less
prestigious and privately financed Mary Baldwin Plan was created by the
Commonwealth, with judicial complicity, as a massive resistance tactic for
the sole purpose of perpetuating gender purity at VMI--not in order to
exclude men. In a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit also characterized VMI's
exclusionary policy euphemistically as not being aimed at barring women,
but rather as preserving "homogeneity of gender."1 °
In a similar sophistical flourish, the Supreme Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson propounded an elaborate fiction explaining why the Louisiana law
segregating railroad passengers was not actually "enacted for the purpose of
humiliating citizens of the United States of a particular race."'..
The
Court reasoned that if a predominantly black legislature were to enact such
a law, whites would not presume that the law relegated whites to an inferior
status. Like the Fourth Circuit in VMI, the Plessy Court simply ignored the
fact that the exclusion of blacks by a predominantly white power structure
(or, as here, the exclusion of women from a predominantly male power
structure), reflected a complex legacy of subordination of one race (or
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. (Hall, J.,
concurring).
VMI II, No. 94-1667, slip op. at 15 (4th Cir. January 26, 1995) (emphasis added).
Id. at 14.
163 U.S. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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gender) to another, which makes a difference in both real-life and constitutional terms. As Professor Laurence H. Tribe has noted: "Racial separation
by force of law conveys strong social stigma and perpetuates both the
stereotypes of racial inferiority and the circumstances upon which such
stereotypes feed. Its social meaning is that the minority race is inferior.",112 The same is true of the gender discrimination in both VMI and
Faulkner: the social meaning conveyed is that women are inferior.
For 152 years, South Carolina has preserved The Citadel, and for 154
years, Virginia has preserved VMI--two of the most prestigious state
colleges in the South--as a bastion of male privilege. It would be poetic
justice indeed if The Citadel and VMI were to be among the principal
players in setting the stage for the Supreme Court to finally recognize
gender equality to be as important a constitutional prescription as is racial
equality.
Determined to cling to outdated notions of men and women that "could
be tolerated [only] in the nineteenth century," South Carolina "continues to
deny its daughters the educational opportunities to which they are entitled."'1 3 Whatever educational opportunities South Carolina and Virginia
offer their sons must be shared on an equal basis with their daughters.

112. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1477 (2nd ed. 1988).
113. Faulkner II, No. 94-1978 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1994) (order granting appellants'
motion for stay pending appeal) (Hall, J., dissenting).

